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LAW IN BOOKS AND LAW IN ACTION:   
THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL CHANGE 
Jean-Louis Halpérin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One hundred years ago, Roscoe Pound wrote his famous article, “Law in 
Books and Law in Action.”1  Considered an important step toward American legal 
realism,2 today this article is invoked more for its title than its content.  I would 
argue that in the article, Pound did not clearly distinguish between two separate 
situations: (1) the departure of decisions of courts from statements of statutory (or 
constitutional) law, and (2) the discrepancy between doctrine in books and 
empirical data about law.  This second observation has fed various strands of 
jurisprudence, if often only through the repetition of the well-quoted formula.3  It is 
not my purpose here to address all of the controversies concerning the relationship 
between legal science and facts.  My target, more modestly, is to identify and 
analyze the connections between Pound’s dichotomy and the European legal 
theories that are influenced by the ideas of Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, and Alf Ross 
about law and facts.  My point of departure is the distrust of American legal 
theorists, who, as a group, consider themselves to be “legal realists,”4 of Kelsen’s 
normativism, which is too often presented by them as a simplistic and outdated 
theory without links to the modern practice of law.5  American legal realism and its 
intellectual progeny, it can be claimed, are better suited to the empirical study of 
complex legal orders that comprise more than the law enacted by the state.  
Although I would argue that Kelsen was both “shocked” and inspired to update his 
arguments when he discovered American realism upon arriving in the United 
States, he failed to convince Americans of the correctness of his Pure Theory of 
Law.6  In Europe, however, many positivists remain faithful to the theories of 
                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, Centre de Théorie et Analyse du Droit, École Normale Supérieure (Paris, 
France). The author addresses many thanks to Professor Martin Rogoff and to Professor Charles Norchi 
for their help in presenting a text written from a European point of view to an American Law Review. 
 1. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). 
 2. See WILLIAM W. FISHER III ET. AL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 3, 7 (1993). 
 3. See, e.g., Katherine R. Kruse, The Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 
498 (2011); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 699 (2011). 
 4. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 734 (2009) 
(reciting the familiar motto that “[w]e are all realists now.”). 
 5. See BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 
AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 2 (2007); JOHN FINNIS, Natural Law: The Classical 
Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 9 (Jules 
Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). 
 6. For an early explanation of his pure theory of law to an American audience, see Hans Kelsen, 
The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1941).  For an American 
reaction to Kelsen’s pure theory of law, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 356 n.5 (1962) (describing Kelsen’s pure theory of law as “utterly sterile.”).  
See also ROSCOE POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 126 (1942) (describing the pure theory of 
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Kelsen and Hart.  The conception of law as a set of norms and a “matter of social 
fact” is considered the core principle of legal positivism.7 
As I will demonstrate, the problem raised by Pound in his 1910 paper is 
virtually identical to the one Kelsen tried to solve a few decades later: how to build 
a legal science without erecting a phantasmagoria of imagined law without 
connection to how law is actually used and actually works.  Legal scholars continue 
to write law books and to describe legal orders, and they do so through making 
choices about what counts as law and is therefore worth presenting to readers.  An 
analysis of these choices that legal scholars must make demonstrates the 
similarities between Kelsen’s arguments and Pound’s approach.  To explore these 
similarities, I will focus on legal change; in particular, I will consider legal change 
in its historical context in order to give empirical content to the tension between 
black-letter law and rules “in action.”  I will use legal history, in part, as a means of 
emphasizing the importance of the rule of change among Hart’s secondary rules,8 
and I will argue that all legal phenomena are in constant evolution.  If I am correct, 
then we can only bring law and facts into closer relation to the extent that we are 
able to understand why law is continually changing. 
II.  LAW IN BOOKS: WHAT ARE LEGAL PHENOMENA? 
Legal writing, especially if it concerns teaching and scholarly research, is 
always a stylized construction, for the obvious reasons of space and practicability.  
In today’s world, it is clearly impossible to know or to theorize about any national 
legal order holistically, or even the important parts of any legal order.  The genre of 
commentaries or institutes of national law is obsolete, although it still has 
advocates in comparative law.9  At the same time, contemporary scholars largely 
eschew the practice of writing elaborate treatises on natural law,10 although there 
are exceptions, arguably in part because they no longer feel comfortable presenting 
rules that are often completely out of touch with legal practice.  Thus, positivists 
and the supporters of natural law both seek to identify, then to describe and 
classify, the phenomena that ought to count as law.  Kelsen’s normativism is the 
result of a long historical commitment to the identification of law as legal rules, 
especially those rules stemming from the recognized sources of state law.  
Although it found its intellectual origins in the “classical” legal positivism of the 
nineteenth century—developed by Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, Friedrich Carl 
von Savigny, Rudolf von Jhering, Karl Bergbohm, and Georg Jellinek—the 
opposition that Kelsen asserted between legal norms and facts has been criticized 
                                                                                                     
law as a “jejune jurisprudence which has cast out all considerations of the precepts of what-ought-to-
be.”). 
 7. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 37 (1979). 
 8. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 93 (1961). According to Hart, one must consider every 
legal system as a union between primary rules of obligations (which impose duties and may have 
similarities with moral or religious rules) and secondary rules conferring powers.  Id.  Hart distinguishes 
between three kinds of secondary rules: rule(s) of recognition for identifying which rules are considered 
as legal, rule(s) of change that authorize individuals or groups to make changes in primary rules, and 
rule(s) of adjudication for organizing judicial process when the law is broken.  Id. at 92-94. 
 9. See generally PETER BIRKS, ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW (2004). 
 10. ALVARDO D’ORS, DERECHO Y SENTIDO COMÚN (2001). 
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on empirical grounds as being in effect inherently non-empirical.11  As a 
consequence of such criticisms, scholars have attempted to define legal phenomena 
as social practices or as cultural discourses rather than as empirical facts.12  It is 
doubtful that Pound would have supported these forms of sociological 
jurisprudence, and in my view, there exists a more appropriate way of reconciling 
Kelsen’s positivism with Pound’s sociological insights.  My goal is neither to 
rescue Kelsen from his critics, nor to reconstruct his legal theory in light of how his 
thought evolved.13  Instead, I will analyze the evolution of his thought in order to 
evaluate various Kelsenian responses to the divergence between “law in books” 
and “law in action.”  I will begin with the popular interpretation of the normative 
science of law, before turning to an analysis of practices and discourses.  I will then 
assess the relationship between Kelsen’s more empiricist conceptions and his 
conviction about the constructivist nature of legal science. 
A.  Normativism as Ordinarily Perceived and Its Limits 
One of the leitmotivs of Kelsen, in place since the period when Pound’s article 
first appeared, has been the fight against all forms of natural law, which is, of 
course, the link that makes him an heir of the legal positivism of the nineteenth 
century.14  For Kelsen, positive law is the only true law: all other versions of the 
law are imagined and therefore either pure ideology or nonsense.  Legal rules are 
not essential principles to be found by reasoning about a natural order, but are 
instead human artefacts imposed by human actions.  At the same time, Kelsen 
considers the law to be a construction made of rules, and conceived as hypothetical 
norms.15  Take the example of criminal law, where any legal rule can be analysed 
as a hypothetical judgment: if A is then B ought to be.16  The limited role of legal 
writing (called “doctrine” in Europe), is to explain in simple statements (or legal 
propositions, Rechtssätze) a rule: e.g., where A is established by a judge, the judge 
is commanded to decide in accordance with B, as fixed in the rule.  All 
constructions of doctrine which are not based upon these simple statements are 
fallacies and expressions of a crypto-natural law, for instance, similar to the 
concepts of subjective right or legal personality.17  From this perspective, moral 
values, considered as facts, are completely eliminated from the legal sphere.  These 
postulates are already present in the first major work of Kelsen, the Hauptprobleme 
                                                                                                     
 11. DENIS LLOYD & M.D.A. FREEDMAN, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 256 (7th ed. 2005). 
 12. See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1998); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL 
NORMS (2000). 
 13. See, e.g., Stanley L. Paulson, Four Phases in Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory? Reflections on a 
Periodization, 18 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 153 (1998); MICHEL TROPER, POUR UNE THÉORIE JURIDIQUE DE 
L’ÉTAT 83 (1994) (making the fruitful distinction between Hans Kelsen’s Theory and “Kelsenism,” the 
latter meaning what we can rebuild from different elements that we pick up in Kelsen’s works). 
 14. HANS KELSEN, HAUPTPROBLEME DER STAATSRECHTSLEHRE ENTWICKELT AUS DER LEHRE VOM 
RECHTSSATZE (2d ed. 1911). 
 15. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 35-37 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1949). 
 16. KELSEN, supra note 14, at 258 (approving of Zitelmann for treating legal rules as judgments and 
not as imperative commands). 
 17. KELSEN, supra note 15, at 8-11. 
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der Staatslehre.18  Legal norms are opposed to causal rules in the natural 
sciences—which link facts and explanations—and the normative world of the 
“Ought” is separated from the empirical world of the “Is”: “no path leads from the 
one world to the other; the two are separated by an unbridgeable gap.”19 
The next step for Kelsen was to identify the criteria according to which rules 
belong to positive law and not to natural law, though the latter is also (as are 
morality and religion) a system of norms.  In his argumentative exchanges with 
Eugen Ehrlich (1915-1917), and then in a work on the philosophical foundations of 
natural and positive law doctrines (1928), Kelsen provided more guidance on how 
to identify positive rules.20  As a set of imposed rules which are interpreted in a 
restrictive context, positive law takes place among real events, and appears (though 
this is rarely mentioned) as a mixture of “Is” (Sein) and “Ought” (Sollen).  In this 
way the law consists of a rule with an “is-like” quality, containing reference to a 
determined human conduct, and implying that legal science can have an empirical 
relation to reality, as do the natural sciences.21  In order to identify legal norms 
among other orders and factual events, Kelsen borrows from Adolf Merkl’s 
Stufenbau theory the idea that every legal act is authorized by a superior norm: the 
individual decision is authorized by a statutory law, which results from a 
constitutional empowering norm.22  It is possible, in the same way, to go back to 
the first historical constitution of the state, but one eventually has to presuppose 
that this first constitution was binding as a fundamental norm.  It is noteworthy that 
in 1928, Kelsen described this Grundnorm not as an idealistic value with a moral 
content, but as an epistemic hypothesis which allowed the legal theorist to claim 
that he or she did not need to rely on materials that exist beyond or behind the 
facts.23 
Concerning the “living law,” which was defended by Ehrlich,24 Kelsen insists 
that informal norms, even when used to structure human relations, are not legal 
facts, but social practices outside the sphere of the law.25  Kelsen deems it 
necessary to fix a boundary between legal norms and social facts, given that the 
latter lack normative force as law.  Legal history, a rarely considered and difficult 
subject for Kelsen, is interpreted by him as a succession of polities, which prefigure 
the modern state, within which legislators imposed constraining legal rules that are 
binding for courts.26  The appearance of law—which every positivist postulates as a 
                                                                                                     
 18. See generally KELSEN, supra note 14. 
 19. Id. at 8.  See also Stanley L. Paulson, Hans Kelsen’s Earliest Legal Theory: Critical 
Constructivism, 59 MOD. L. REV 802 (1996) (translating Kelsen’s earliest works). 
 20. HANS KELSEN, DIE PHILOSOPHISCHEN GRUNDLAGEN DER NATURRECHTSLEHRE UN DES 
RECHTSPOSITIVISMUS (1928). 
 21. See generally Hans Kelsen, Eine Grundelung des Rechtssosziologie (Archiv für 
Socialswissenschaft und Sozialpolitik) (1915) in AGOSTINO CARRINO, SCIENZA GIURIDICA E 
SOCIOLOGIA DEL DIRITTO 68 (Agostino Carrino ed. and trans., 1992). 
 22. KELSEN, supra note 15, at 143-44. 
 23. See generally KELSEN, supra note 20. 
 24. See EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 486-506 (Walter 
L. Moll trans., 1936). 
 25. KELSEN, supra note 15, at 20-21. 
 26. See generally Jean-Louis Halpérin, Histoire du Droit et Théorie du Droit: Un Essai de 
Conciliation, 51 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOHIE DU DROIT 281 (2008). 
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historical event according to the conception of law as a human convention—
presupposes first the existence of courts, then the establishment of a power able to 
assure that the orders of the courts are respected.  In the 1911 Hauptprobleme, 
Kelsen notes that in the age of customary law, legal norms were confused with 
moral rules, which justified their historical study as law.27  But with the progress of 
statutory law in modern states, law acquired its formal independence and legal 
dogmatics had to be separated from legal history.28  In the 1945 General Theory of 
Law and State, Kelsen went so far as to assimilate Babylonian law, the customs of 
an African tribe (the Ashantis), the Swiss constitution, and American law as legal 
orders that evidence “a specific social technique of a coercive order.”29 
It is clear that Kelsen does not deny the reality of legal orders, but only insists 
that the proper objective of legal science is to describe legal rules through 
propositions of law.  As he wrote in the first edition of the Reine Rechtslehre: “The 
norms as such, not to be confused with the acts by means of which the norm is 
issued, do not exist in space and time, for they are not a fact of nature.”30  Can we 
say that in the first stages of Kelsen’s theory there exists a “confusion . . . between 
the norms created by legal authorities and the propositions which appear in legal 
textbooks[?]”31  In fact, there was an evolution in how Kelsen theorized about the 
“reproduction” of legal norms through legal propositions postulated in law books.  
In Kelsen’s constructivist conception, legal science creates its own object and legal 
norms are necessarily formulated through legal propositions.  From the 1920s to 
the beginning of the 1960s (and the second edition of the Reine Rechtslehre), 
Kelsen considered that “norms created and applied within the framework of a legal 
system have the character of legal norms only if legal science ascribes this 
character to them.”32  In this way, legal norms are constructions of legal science 
and law can be captured only in books, though empirical verifiability is assumed.  
In General Theory of Law and State, Kelsen repeats that the contents of positive 
law “can be uniquely ascertained by an objective method.  The existence of the 
value of law is conditioned by objectively verifiable facts.”33  If legal propositions 
can be true or false, this presupposes comparison between legal norms and 
phenomena that are not legal norms.34 
In many of his writings, Kelsen gives the impression that he subscribes to the 
German “copy theory” of knowledge, according to which legal propositions 
reproduce, and thereby formulate, legal norms.35  The examples given by Kelsen 
himself, especially regarding “simple” penal rules, have reinforced the idea that 
normativism has reduced the role of doctrine to a rather naïve repetition of norms.  
                                                                                                     
 27. KELSEN, supra note 14, at 31.   
 28. Id. at 33-42. 
 29. KELSEN, supra note 15, at 20. 
 30. HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY: A TRANSLATION OF THE 
FIRST EDITION OF RIENE RECHTSLEHRE OR PURE THEORY OF LAW 12 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & 
Stanley L. Paulson trans., 1992). 
 31. Michael Hartney, Introduction to HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF NORMS, at xxiii (1991). 
 32. HANS KELSEN, THÉORIE PURE DU DROIT 53 (Henri Thévenaz trans., 1953) (containing Kelsen’s 
revisions of the text). 
 33. KELSEN, supra note 15, at 49. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Paulson, supra note 13, at 158 & n.28. 
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We will see from the discussion below that Kelsen opens new windows to a freer 
conception of interpretation through doctrine, by comparing legal interpretation to 
musical interpretation.36  But there is no doubt that a common, if not misleading, 
view of Kelsenian normativism sees it as “law in books,” thus ascribing Kelsenian 
method to hypothetical statements, which only reproduce legal norms.37 
It is easy to understand the criticisms by formalist and reductionist schools of 
thought addressed to this form of “relaxed” normativism.  Here, the contradiction 
begins with Pound’s move to take greater account of the more flexible practices of 
judge-made law.  Kelsen tells us how to recognize law—with the “coercion” test 
(so as not to confuse the orders of the highway bandit with legal commands) 
supplemented by the “habilitation” test (proving that the rule has been created by a 
legal authority with the power to do so)—but he is silent about the method by 
which the rules may be extracted from the “raw materials.”38  The implication is 
that legal science may freely construct legal norms, so long as it verifies ex post 
some correspondence with reality.  This silence may explain Kelsen’s 
embarrassment concerning his analyses of customary law and the place of judge-
made law.  Concerning the former, Kelsen rejects Austin’s thesis on the exclusive 
competence of the state to recognize customary rules—arguing that the state is not 
the only power that creates law—and asserts that customary law is established by 
the subjects of law according to constitutional (which itself can be customary) 
authorization.39  With this characterization of decentralized legal orders, Kelsen 
faces a problem: he cannot explain how to differentiate moral or social customs 
from legal norms.  Relative to judge-made law, the distinction (which does not 
include a clear definition of the criteria used to discriminate between norms) 
between general and individual norms seems, at its origins, to give more attention 
to general norms as truly creative than to “individual” norms, which are 
adjudicated decisions and appear as the mere application of pre-determined rules.  
Discussing the thesis of John Chipman Gray in General Theory of Law and State, 
Kelsen admits that judicial precedents can create general norms, but he limits this 
possibility to common law systems only, where it would exist (by virtue of statute 
or in the customary constitution?) as an entitlement of courts to create legal rules.40  
Such an admission fails to explain the important place of judge-made law in civil 
law systems and to provide a criterion by which to discriminate between judicial 
legislation (we know that the identification of a legal rule in a precedent is not an 
easy task) and the “individual” norms present among the courts decisions.41 
Finally, this common interpretation of Kelsen’s normativism, apparently well 
suited as a model for top down legal orders—that is, for a model moving from 
constitutional norms to the detailed examination of general norms—does not 
adequately capture or explain a perpetually moving legal practice.  Not 
                                                                                                     
 36. KELSEN, supra note 32, at 54. 
 37. See Gustav Bergmann & Lewis Zerby, The Formalism in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, 55 
ETHICS 110 (1945). 
 38. KELSEN, supra note 15, at 18-20. 
 39. Id. at 127-28. 
 40. Id. at 149-50. 
 41. TROPER, supra note 13, at 71-83; NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF 
PRECEDENT 109 (2008) (noting the absence of a “satisfactory overarching theory of precedent.”). 
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surprisingly, critics of “law in books” will reject Kelsen’s well ordered description 
as flawed, as it is based on an outdated methodology that ignores too many 
empirical facts to be considered useful.  Let us see if the proposed alternatives have 
been more successful. 
B.  The Impasse of Rule-skepticism and Legal Pluralism 
It may appear surprising to combine aspects of American legal realism and 
legal pluralism, since the advocates of the latter movement do not make many 
references to the former.  Yet the works of Karl Llewellyn provide a link between 
rule-skepticism and the recognition of the multiple ways to regulate groups as 
independent legal orders: this widens the gap between law in books, assimilated 
with the description of rules (especially rules issuing from the state), and law in 
action, identified with the multiplicity of legal disputes (including legal disputes 
outside the sphere of state).  Here, rule-skepticism, as conceived by Llewellyn, is a 
denial of the importance and determinacy of rules in empirical legal situations 
(without a complete denial of all rules in law, including the rules of recognition that 
are necessary to legitimate court decisions)42 with a correlative focus on judicial 
decisions or actions.43 
In his 1930 work, Bramble Bush, Karl Llewellyn chooses as a point of 
departure the discovery, made during his teaching of law (as is pertinent to a 
discussion about law for scholars and students), that “rules alone, mere forms of 
words, are worthless.”44  Rather, as a “set of rules of conduct,” law consists of 
official actions in resolving disputes or in other applications.45  These actions, 
particularly court decisions, are characterized by some regularity because officials 
take account of the authoritative command of constitutional and legislative rules, 
but the raw materials of law consist of relatively indeterminate decisions.  For this 
reason, case law studies and the identification of precedents are important, but they 
do not exhaust the empirical depth of the law.46 
In the same year, 1930, Llewellyn’s famous paper, A Realistic Jurisprudence—
The Next Step,47 focused on critiques of Pound’s methodology.48  The question 
                                                                                                     
 42. Hart has criticized this kind of rule-skepticism as inconsistent with the recognition of binding 
court decisions.  See HART, supra note 8, at 133. 
 43. Leiter considers that realists have not been conceptual rule-skeptics because the concept of law 
as “just a prediction of what a court will do” concerns the job of practicing lawyers, not the one of legal 
academics.  LEITER, supra note 5, at 68-73.  It is one part of the thesis defended by Llewellyn himself in 
the foreword of the second edition of the Bramble Bush where he speaks about a theoretical tempest in a 
teapot and an erroneous interpretation of realism as a philosophy of unbelief towards legal rules.  KARL 
N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 9-10 (2nd ed. 1951).  But it seems to me that Llewellyn’s 
precedent presupposes a concept of law that denies the central place for state rules and gives to scholars 
the function to investigate other legal phenomena. 
 44. LLEWELLYN, supra note 43, at 12 (emphasis omitted). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 226 
(1995). 
 47. Karl N. Llwellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930). 
 48. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 173 
(1992) (describing Llewellyn’s piece as offering “a slight variation on Pound’s famous and important 
distinction between law in books and law in action” in fact to attack Pound). 
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posed by Llewellyn in this article was to determine the “focus” or “point of 
reference” of legal matters, which properly evokes the works of academics about 
the concept of law.49  He contests Pound’s approach, claiming that it is limited to 
rules, precepts, and words.50  Not only is the term “rule” ambiguous as it applies 
both to a “formula in authoritative books” and the regular proceedings of the 
courts, but Llwellyn argues that the “rules of substantive law are of far less 
importance than most legal theorizers have assumed in most of their thinking and 
writing.”51  According to Llewellyn, the most significant aspects of law lie in the 
field of behavior, and inquiry must be made into the decision “in each case.”52  A 
very similar formula—”the law therefore consists of decisions, not of rules”—was 
used that same year by Jerome Frank in Law and the Modern Mind.53  Thinking 
seriously about the distinction between “law-in-books and law-in-action” means 
refocusing the emphasis of legal research on observable behavior.  Rule-skepticism 
is concerned here with “paper rules”—as well as precedent in statutes or 
administrative regulations—as opposed to a broader conception of legal life.  
Pound is accused of leaving “law in action” as a simple suggestion, while further 
discussions are centered on precepts.54 
Probably recalling Ehrlich’s conception of “living law,” Llewellyn also makes 
footnoted reference to Bronislaw Malinowski’s analysis in Crime and Custom in 
Savage Society.55  Prudently, Llewellyn presupposes the presence of “‘rules of law’ 
i.e., at least assuming law as a semi-specialized activity of control distinguished 
from other mechanisms of control.”56  Trying to move the “point of reference” for 
legal matters towards the totality of court decisions (and not only certain selected 
precedents), he indicates that he would like to see some proof of the implicit norms 
and practices that could be, although with some hesitation, considered as law, 
incorporated into the procedures of those specialized formations (like courts, 
tribunals, etc.) that adjudicate disputes.57  I would suggest that the “next step” 
towards a realistic jurisprudence would, at the same time, include more facets of 
sociology in empirical studies as well as more facets of anthropology in the 
definition of law. 
For Llewellyn, this next step took the form of The Cheyenne Way, written with 
E. Adamson Hoebel, where he developed the idea, already present in Bramble 
Bush, that each society secretes a legal order (as a given phenomena) consisting of 
ways to resolve disputes.58  In contrast to the “ideological” (and without a doubt 
misleading) path toward “rules,” the best avenues to understand the law are those 
dealing with practices, and even better, with “instances of hitch, dispute, grievance, 
                                                                                                     
 49. Llwellyn, supra note 47, at 432. 
 50. Id. at 434-35. 
 51. Id. at 442. 
 52. Id. at 444. 
 53. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 128 (6th ed. 1949). 
 54. Llewellyn, supra note 47, at 435 n.3. 
 55. Id. at 436 n.4.  See also WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 
153 (1973) (discussing Llewellyn’s treatment of Malinowski). 
 56. Llewellyn, supra note 47, at 436 n.4. 
 57. Id. 
 58. KARL LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 20-21 (1941). 
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and trouble.”59  The focus, for instance, for an empirical investigation of Cheyenne 
law, is on disputes and breaches “which [are] marked by authority—which is 
recognized as imperative.”60  Llewellyn describes legal norms as being found in 
words, rituals, and “litigious custom,” thus adopting the words of the British legal 
historian Paul Vinogradoff.61  Again quoting Malinowski, Llewellyn presupposes 
that each social group and subgroup has its own order and “norms for the Entirety 
which is in question.”62  Llewellyn contends that if these norms give birth to 
disruptions which are submitted to any form of justice, “the handling of such 
disruptions . . . per se pertain[] to the law of the tribe.”63  Might the axiomatic idea 
of legal pluralism identify law outside of state rules and take account of all 
decisions by organs empowered to regulate social disputes? 
Appearing thirty years after Llewellyn’s The Cheyenne Way, in the 1970s and 
the 1980s, legal pluralism was basically rooted in anthropological works about 
Asian, African, and Oceanic societies.64  Beginning with the study of personal 
status in colonial and post-colonial situations (for example in Asia, especially in 
India), which supposes the coexistence of two or more legal systems within the 
same social field (which is called “weak pluralism”),65 this movement gave birth to 
a legal theory which challenged traditional positivism (including the ideas of 
Kelsen and Hart) as an “ideology of legal centralism” which was based on the myth 
of a sovereign rule of recognition, a kind of crypto natural law, or an ideal of law 
that “ought to be.”66  On the contrary, legal pluralists believe that legal facts appear 
spontaneously (or in a completely decentralized way) in the social norms of every 
society and that the study of judicial decisions (or more generally, of any kind of 
dispute resolution) is the only way to describe the legal regulation of society.67  
This very broad concept of law has also been used by industrialized countries in 
order to bring together official and unofficial forms of ordering, or court decisions 
and “nonlegal forms of normative order.”68  Through this conception of legal raw 
materials, pluralists rejoin (without always quoting their forerunners) the “Freies 
Recht” movement of the beginning of the twentieth century—particularly Ehrlich’s 
legal sociology which was criticized by Kelsen—and the rule-skepticism of some 
American realists—especially Llewellyn’s approach to legal decisions and 
“primitive” law.  Any kind of rule-centered law in books and a fortiori description 
of a Kelsenian hierarchy of state norms are disqualified by pluralists, who propose, 
on the other hand, to look for law in action in all those social norms that are 
revealed by dispute resolution decisions. 
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As a creation of the law school, legal pluralism does not reject the writing of 
legal books: it actually pretends to use all the resources of the social sciences to 
reach the “real” empirical legal order by abandoning traditional legal doctrines, 
which are accused of imposing on the Western discourse of professional lawyers.  
Logically, this point is not acceptable to the legal theorists who think that law 
defines its own limits or to the positivists who consider law to be an invented 
technique which is not present in every society.  The ambition of a “meta-
narrative” of legal anthropology would seem to be too comprehensive (with the 
illusory goal of grasping the totality of social phenomena with which the law is 
related) and too ignorant of the constructive aspects (not to speak of the doctrinal 
traditions) of legal science.  As Kelsen has argued against Ehrlich, legal science 
would thus be dissolved in to a general sociology which does not discriminate legal 
phenomena from social ones and does not take account of the auto-description of 
legal systems from the internal point of view of the lawyer.  One of the most patent 
frailties of legal pluralism stems from a contradictory and vague definition of law 
that is conflated with all forms of social control.69  Other responses to the 
arguments of pluralists take the following forms: (1) the claim that law is a 
technique which is absent in some societies, and even in some polities with 
“judges,” is not ethnocentrically imperialistic because it is not a value judgment 
(the invention of law is not considered as “progress”) and proof of the appearance 
of such technique can be found in the histories of non-Western civilizations;70 (2) 
in many cases so-called “spontaneous” customs are actually the products (perhaps 
designated as “customary law”) of state recognition, or of the “invention of a 
tradition” by Western colonizers (as accepted by more nuanced pluralists like Sally 
Falk Moore);71 (3) though legal pluralism rejects law as a particular technique of 
social control and looks for a general understanding of social regulation, it can also 
be suspected of essentialism in its search for what would be “beneath the law.”72  
For all these reasons, a legal pluralism which is based on a conceptual rule-
skepticism seems to be an obstacle to understanding law in action as it is related to 
law in books. 
C.  Focusing on Legal Discourse and the Risk of Losing Contact with Empirical 
Facts 
An alternative pattern to the rules-centered approach results from looking at 
“law” as a set of discourses. One such method is based on theories of interpretation 
and hermeneutics, and grew out of the philosophical works of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Paul Ricoeur.  This current of thought 
posited that a text exists and acquires meaning through the interpretation of its 
readers, and has introduced into the legal field the theory of discursive modalities, 
which has been defended in the study of literary sources, particularly in the work of 
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Stanley Fish.73  Other authors have also contributed to this school of thought.  
Philip Bobbitt has analyzed the development of judicial review as a grammar of 
interpretative practices which use different forms of arguments that are not directly 
linked with realities in the world.74  James Boyd White has compared law and 
literature to compositional activities which consist of texts and meanings that live 
through interpretation.75  Dennis Patterson has used Fish’s schemes of 
interpretative communities to say that the “truth” of legal claims is based on a 
textual, doctrinal, historical, and prudential backing and not in a “certain relation to 
some state of affairs,” as argued by the realists.76  Using a different point of 
departure, Ronald Dworkin has also defined law as an interpretive practice made 
up of a textual chain constructed by judicial opinions.77  If law consists of 
principles and interpretations, and not of rules, the gap between law in action and 
law in books is easier to ascertain: law in action is created through legal discourses 
which are confused and conflated with discourse about law that we can find in 
books. 
Yet another current of thought has insisted upon the authority of a legal 
discourse based on a mythology of law.  Here the analyses of Michel Foucault 
about the knowledge-power dynamic,78 as well as the works of Pierre Legendre,79 
assert that legal discourse can exercise a real power upon the human mind by 
means of the authority of jurisprudential writings and court decisions, and without 
reliance on the coercive power of the state.80  The outcome of such influences, 
which is pertinent to our subject, lies in those cultural legal studies that insist on the 
discursive nature of law.  If our belief in the rule of law and the benefits of legal 
order rests upon discourse, law and legal science are not separated as traditional 
positivists affirm, but are linked into a constructed world that can be identified with 
the empirical world of facts.  Empiricism in the law is situated not in social facts 
but within legal discourse and its practice of self-reflection. 
Another current, which also has its origins in different intellectual conceptions, 
is represented by continental social systems theory, as developed in the legal field 
by Niklas Luhmann.81  Here, the point of departure is a constructivist theory of 
science which assumes that law is an autonomous, “autopoietic” system: not only 
does legal science define its own object and its own boundaries, but law is a set of 
discourses which consist of a self-description of legal norms.82  With a positivist 
approach like that of Dworkin, and a constructivism that can be reconciled with 
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Kelsen’s Kantian convictions, Luhmann has compared law to language and other 
networks of communication.83  Every social system operates through 
communication and law is “in action” through a self-description of the legal 
discourse of judges, officials, or professors.  “Law has no binding force.  It consists 
purely of communication and of structural deposits of communication, which 
convey such meanings.”84  For these reasons, law does not need any extra-legal 
idea beyond that of a fundamental norm in order to sustain the legal system.  It is 
no longer necessary to have a correspondence between norms and empirical facts.  
The distinction between norms and facts is situated inside the legal system, and 
legal facts are, as legal norms, artifacts of legal discourse.  The lawyer, as well as 
the scholar, the judge, or the practicing attorney, has no choice but to participate in 
this system, through this self-description.  By this logic, only the sociologist with 
an external point of view could study legal science, but it is still quite impossible to 
reach an empirical legal order that does not exist as a sub-system, or as some form 
of a factual “reality.”  A “traditional” legal sociology is in some ways discredited 
because it studies those differences in “legal” practices, which do not count as 
“law” for the participants in the system. 
All of these currents, based on hermeneutics, and sometimes qualified as 
“post-modern” or “post-positivist” (which seems inconsistent with Dworkin’s 
thesis), indeed converge in their placement of the essence of law in discourse, i.e., 
in contemporary books (or texts likely to be published in books).  One can say that 
law in action is in essence communication, including communication through 
books, and that there is no possibility of disjunction between an empirical reality, 
which is of no crucial importance for law, and the legal discourses developed by 
interpretive communities of lawyers (especially those with official functions).  
Apparently Pound’s problem was at least partially resolved by a serious scholarly 
effort which became aware of the “unreality” of a law that exists in its own 
linguistic and cultural sphere. 
The goals of legal scholarship, which is only one form among other legal 
discourses and often linked with legal education, arguably are not agreed upon by 
the advocates of these different currents.  Some may seek to denounce the credulity 
of lawyers, thinking that they believe in a mythological discourse that supposes the 
possible verification of legal “truth” through empirical tests.  This fundamental 
criticism is directed at legal positivists and undermines any attempt to construct a 
science of law.  I would suggest that for these critics, it follows that law in books 
would always be a fallacy, except for in those books which show legal mythology 
in action.  This was not Pound’s purpose, and it is not acceptable to positivists who 
observe law in action with all its coercive force and “teeth.”  Luhmann’s 
conception of law in action is not destructive of the idea of a legal science, as he 
insists on the autonomy and the historical evolution of the legal system.85  
Luhmann also made a clear distinction between judicial and scholarly discourses.  
The former, intended to settle disputes, he described as a self-observation of what 
is legal and what is illegal and as the co-ordination of legal elements used to justify 
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a decision.86  The latter he considered as a presentation of the unity of the legal 
system through books, in other words, academic works destined to give 
homogeneity to norms but not to order human conduct.87  Luhmann’s distinction 
between a “second-level” observation and a “third-level” observation recalls the 
opposition between law and legal science postulated by classical positivists.  In 
Luhmann’s theory, there seems to be room for a legal science that depends on the 
internal point of view of lawyers and tries to understand how law progresses in 
action, especially in a historical sense, and how legal discourses develop over time.  
Luhmann had a real interest in legal history and in the observation of change in the 
application of rules (the second level) and evolution in legal thought (the third 
level).88  Although there is no clear indication of it at this point in Luhmann’s 
work, which relates more to a sociologist studying social systems and to not trying 
to build a legal science, one can imagine a fourth level of a meta-legal science 
which analyzes “law in action” through “law in books.” 
Despite the different nuances in the thought of these scholars who advocate the 
study of a legal discourse that is disconnected from empirical reality, there are 
some common flaws in their approaches.  First, as has already been noted, these 
analyses underestimate the law’s grip on reality.  Law can bite, and often bites with 
a violence that is not purely symbolic.89  This impact of “law in action” does not 
identify with legal discourse, which can hide or soften these legal manifestations of 
violence.  It is well known that legal scholarship is often reluctant to take account 
of certain normative evolutions and that there are many examples of a time-lag 
between a change in rules or judicial decisions and the recognition of that change 
by legal writing.  The dialectic of scientific revolutions or paradigm shifts is based 
upon the long duration of conceptual evolutions compared to factual ones.90  
Studying legal phenomena as discourse, without making clear-cut distinctions 
between norms and legal science, increases the risk of losing contact with the legal 
mechanisms that are working in empirical reality. 
Even in a conception of legal phenomena that insists upon the symbolic 
structure of law and its “power of naming” (which means classifying and thus 
instituting social realities), like Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis of the “force of law,” it 
is still necessary for a sociologist to distinguish legal discourse and social action (or 
conflict) within the legal field.91  This distinction is, a fortiori, indispensable for the 
positivist legal theorist who does not want to be a victim of the “indigenous 
discourse” of lawyers about the supposed autonomy of law.  Thus, theories which 
reduce law to the discourse of lawyers provide support for a closed off area for 
legal scholarship that is far too large and comfortable for lawyers themselves (who 
are always flattered by highlighting their own internal point of view and the idea of 
a restricted legal sphere).  The risk here is in believing that law exists only through 
scholarly discourse and being too credulous toward the power of legal education to 
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create a virtual world.  This might lead to a return to the jurisprudence of concepts 
(Begriffsjurisprudenz) as practiced by German Pandectists in the nineteenth 
century, as well as to the legal formalism criticized by American realists!92 
Such risks are known and assumed by some of the advocates of a radical 
constructivism like Luhmann.  Yet the system approach, attacked by those legal 
sociologists inspired by Bourdieu, does not assign a precise task to legal science.  If 
legal sociology can be developed as an external point of view about legal science as 
object, it is not clear how positivist lawyers can defend a semi-external point of 
view about law, or how they can select among legal phenomena (for instance, 
judicial decisions) to identify those which are pertinent for creating or changing 
norms.  
D.  Accepting the Gap Between Law in Society and Law in Books 
The three examined approaches—classical normativism supposing that legal 
science reproduces legal norms, realism considering that legal facts are revealed by 
judicial decisions, and discursive analysis which amalgamates all legal 
statements—all deny the importance of the gap between “law in books” and “law 
in action.”  Scandinavian realists have proposed the elimination of this dichotomy 
by treating all legal phenomena as facts which address an “Ought to be”93: on one 
hand, there are “patterns of behavior,” especially those prescribed by law courts, 
and on the other hand, there are “words printed in the law books,” or prophecies 
made by lawyers regarding court decisions.94 
Acute critics of Hart have shown how difficult it is to say that judges or 
legislators make prophecies about their own actions.95  Even if we accept a 
discourse of “normative facts,”96 a discrepancy remains between prescriptive facts 
inserted in a political reality and the imagined constructions of legal science.  
Positivists consider that legal science is different from its object, even if this object 
is an intellectual construction based on experience.  I would suggest that the facts 
that we can study empirically are social phenomena and are not pre-qualified as 
normative phenomena.  There is some consensus on the idea that “normative facts” 
are inserted into a social reality that contains many other non-legal phenomena.97  It 
is not so easy to isolate legal phenomena (linked in one way or another to the legal 
sphere) from non-legal phenomena.  I would contend that the empirical legal order, 
defined by Max Weber as a representation of the rules supposed to govern human 
                                                                                                     
 92. The classic critique of Begriffsjuriprudenz (the jurisprudence of concepts) is RUDOLF VON 
JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (Isaac Husik, transl., 1968).  For an early critique of legal 
formalism from an American realist perspective, see, for example, Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr., The Path 
of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1910).  See also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 253-266 (1977); HORWITZ, supra note 48, at 9-31; DUNCAN KENNEDY, 
THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2006). 
 93. KARL OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT 28 (1939); ÉRIC MILLARD, THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE DU DROIT 
44-46 (2004). 
 94. OLIVECRONA, supra note 93, at 20; ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 19-34 (1958). 
 95. MICHEL TROPER, The Fact and the Law, in LAW, INTERPRETATION, REALITY: ESSAYS IN 
EPISTEMOLOGY, HERMENEUTICS AND JURISPRUDENCE 22, 22-37 (P. Nerhot ed., 1990). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 77, at 410-13. 
60 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1 
behavior,98 is not “given” to the observer.  One can even doubt that it exists as an 
identifiable reality with precise limits which prevent integration of misconceptions 
about legal significance.99  For this reason, legal science cannot be a naïve 
reproduction of “normative facts” and needs the definition of a concept of law by 
which to isolate legal phenomena. 
It is here that the link to reconcile empiricism and constructivism is situated.  
The observer constructs a legal order by recognizing the legal character of some 
facts and analyzing these norms as pieces in a normative system.  As Joseph Raz 
has shown, using our concept of law, dependent on the observer and not 
necessarily shared by other lawyers, including those working in the observed legal 
system, does not prevent this concept in the study of past or foreign societies from 
having a universal hermeneutic impact.100  As a positivist, I can adhere to Hart’s 
concept of law and use it as a tool to construct legal orders. 
The so-called “rule of change” has been emphasized by Hart as one of the 
secondary rules (along with the recognition and adjudication rules) that are 
necessary to transform social (or primary) rules into legal norms.101  If we think 
that one of the main features of law is the possibility to change norms, it must be 
admitted that local techniques for doing this have been invented in different places 
throughout history.  The history of Roman law, as well as that of Chinese law, 
shows that the “invention” of law occurs when a legislative authority both foresees 
and permits the future alteration of existing law.102  With this in mind, Hart’s rule 
of change can be understood as a sociological rule that links social and legal 
change.  This second interpretation is a question for legal sociology rather than for 
legal theory. 
I argue that there is a third use of the rule of change, even if not intended by 
Hart, in analyzing the construction of legal science.  As we have said, a legal order 
does not exist empirically and is undetermined, because it is impossible, even in a 
limited space and time, to describe the totality of meanings and representations 
linked to legal statements.  Even if we do not share a complete rule-skepticism and 
follow the positivist principle, according to which the validity (or the binding 
force) of legal norms can be tested empirically (with the use of secondary rules), 
we cannot make a verification of a legal order, which is a hypothetical 
construction.  We have to use schemas, or ideal-types, which order and simplify, 
often for didactic reasons, the legal norms inserted in the social reality. 
Following Max Weber’s warning, ideal-types have to be changed to take 
account of historical evolution, as well as to develop new research programs.  With 
the point of departure provided by Pound’s formula, legal scholars must be 
particularly sensitive to changes in legal norms in order to avoid an excessive gap 
between obsolete law in books and empirically ascertained law in action.  Even 
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with the quick circulation of information prevalent in modern times, there is always 
delay in constructing and making the public aware of new legal arrangements, so 
that “law in books” is almost always a historical statement of former legal norms.  
In some ways, every legal scholar is a legal historian.  For this reason, one of the 
tasks (but not the only task) of legal science is to study change in law, which 
includes a determination of whether new norms are changing the constructed legal 
order (or not).  Even a positivist who is reluctant to look to history cannot deny this 
dynamic of legal orders.  As Luhmann has written, “law is also a historical machine 
in the sense that each autopoeitic operation changes the system.”103  Here, 
sociologists and legal scholars can diverge in their respective fields of research: the 
former are prone to choose a micro-level for studying every new legal norm—even 
the routine decisions which do not affect the structure of the legal order, but are 
indications about social practices linked with law—whereas the latter often prefer 
(especially for didactic reasons) to adopt a macro-level for trying to understand 
national, international, or global law.  In the construction of these macro-level legal 
orders, it is necessary to make a selection of general norms (rather than individual 
norms) and to determine if a new norm makes a significant change in the 
constructed scheme. 
Law in action is “law in change”: a legal science aware of the relativity of its 
constructed object but anxious to be closely linked to empirical data supposes a 
study of these changes in norms.  Constructing a legal order through the analysis of 
legal change can also help to resolve some of the problems posed by the advocates 
of oral or plural law.  If we can prove that a legal change has been provoked by an 
oral tradition—and generally this kind of proof depends upon written material—
there is room to explore the contribution of oral consensus to the construction of a 
legal order, as John Baker has shown regarding the role of common learning within 
the Inns of Court in the development of common law.104  With this method, we can 
also analyze the impact of social practices—or the absence of such impact—upon 
legal change.105  With the recent growth of international law, the focus on legal 
change is decisive in fostering an appreciation of the construction of new legal 
orders.  All the recent debates about “global law,” including the supposed outdating 
of state legal orders and the “deconstruction” of the hierarchy of norms, are based 
upon the question of the necessity (or the absence of necessity) of a paradigm shift 
that takes account of new legal norms and tests them empirically.106 
Gadamer has proposed a comparison of the hermeneutics of judges and legal 
historians, as both try to isolate and interpret legal phenomena.107  The judge must 
first isolate the legal questions in a case by identifying what is legal and what is not 
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legal according to a binary categorization.  To resolve disputes, the judge rarely 
considers one rule in isolation; there is thus a coordination of different meanings to 
arrive at a decision.  For each of the rules mobilized to resolve the case, the judge 
has to decide which meaning is pertinent.  The reasoning of legal historians 
diverges from that of judges, as do their goals.  Whereas the latter have to settle an 
empirical lawsuit (inserted in the social reality) and to create a new (individual, 
sometimes with a general impact) norm, the former must identify legal norms in the 
abstract, and study all the interpretations given to them in the past.108  As the legal 
historian does not have direct access to empirical reality, she has to study all the 
successive meanings given to a legal statement and in the cases where this legal 
statement has always been in force, to extend the examination up to the present 
day.109  The legal historian has to isolate and organize normative facts according to 
the changes brought about by different meanings in the construction of the legal 
order.110  This “historical” method brings us halfway in our analysis of Pound’s 
formula: considering that one of the tasks of legal science is to continually update 
our understanding of the legal order so that we may take account of change, we 
must now examine the methodological questions linked with the problem of 
grasping law in action. 
III.  LAW IN ACTION: THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL CHANGE 
As Rudolf von Jhering has said, the law is like “Saturn devouring his own 
children,” as law is perpetually renewed by contradictory changes.111  Though some 
legal historians might readily admit that one of the main characteristics of legal 
norms is that they make possible and organize their own change, it would seem that 
many lawyers would resist the idea that legal norms are interchangeable and that 
changes in the law are evaluated for their desirability during the construction of 
new legal arrangements.  Consciously or not, the selection of legal norms made in 
the creation of law in books consists of an intellectual manipulation of empirical 
data.  The enormous and ever increasing mass of legal norms appears to us through 
successive “archaeological” excavations.  We first have to identify legal norms 
among layers of social practices where law is implicated.  Then there is a need to 
select those legal norms which impact changes in the legal order, because they are 
likely to have structural consequences upon other (past or future) legal norms.  It 
would not be a useless exercise, even if it were rarely undertaken, to attempt to 
measure this change with objective indicators.  In most cases, legal changes are 
likely to affect a plurality of legal orders and legal scholars have to consider the 
questions—well debated in comparative law—regarding the implementation or 
transplantation of legal changes in more than one legal order.  An awareness of the 
conventional nature of legal construction should not prevent us from trying to 
“understand” legal change, in Weberian terms, and to link our imagined 
“descriptions” of law with reflections about the factors of this perpetual dynamic. 
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A.  Identifying Legal Change 
By identifying the reluctance of lawyers to accept legal change, we highlight 
the conservative bias of jurists (who are the enemies of revolution), because they, 
according to Tocqueville, do not like to see changes in the law they have learned.112  
It is also important to think about the persistent binding force of the rules that were 
promulgated in a remote past, and the insistence of legal scholars (not only legal 
historians) on the phenomena of inertia in legal orders.  It may be argued that 
certain past or present legal systems are not open to change (or to substantial 
change), in contrast with modern democratic legal orders, where legal change is 
easy and numerous changes are occasioned by changes in political leadership.  The 
idea that secondary rules of change are linked with the realist conception of legal 
interpretation is largely accepted today, as the following brief discussion will 
demonstrate. 
Arguably, legal norms are historically linked with religious norms and legal 
systems, much like Jewish or Islamic Law, which are based on a core dogma that is 
not open to change, because it supposedly contains a divine and revealed truth.  It 
would appear, however, that there is room for change in religious law, especially if 
we take account of its applicability in the legal orders of social communities (where 
there are courts and the possibility to test the validity of norms).  Concerning 
Jewish law, not only can the divine lawgiver change laws (the Ten Commandments 
were given twice to Moses in different versions113), but the Talmud is largely based 
on the idea that different interpretations are possible and can evolve over time.  
One Talmudic master wrote:  
If the Torah had been given in fixed and inimitable formulations, it would not have 
endured.  Thus Moses pleaded with the Lord, Master of the universe, reveal to me 
the final truth in each question of doctrine and law.  To which the Lord replied: 
There are no pre-existent final truths in doctrine or law; the truth is the considered 
judgment of the majority of authoritative interpreters in every generation.114 
Is there a better explanation of the fabric of norms?  Islamic law also contains a 
doctrine concerning the “abrogation” of a given text within the Koran by another, 
which is manifested by the disagreement of the principal schools (Madhhabs) about 
the words and acts of the Prophet.115  There is also a large expanse of religious 
doctrine that is open to legal reflection (Fiqh), and in some fields, to the legislative 
power of Islamic rulers.116  Whether the rule of abrogation is admitted expressly or 
tacitly, it is no problem to recognize that authoritative interpretations of core 
statements can also change. 
Returning to secular law, the problem of identifying legal change overlaps to a 
great extent with the classical topic of “sources of law.”  Lawyers have worked 
continually to identify the authoritative foundations of statements which give the 
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statements validity as law.  Today, this problem seems easily resolved through the 
recognition of constitutions, statutes, precedents, regulations, or customary rules as 
legal statements (or statements which are supposedly “legal” by virtue of their 
form), whereas legal writing (or doctrine) is no longer considered, as in Roman law 
or past legal orders that recognized the authoritative force of doctorum communis 
opinio.117  In most cases, this recognition is made through judicial interpretation, 
and the validity of the norm is verified through its “application” by courts.  One 
must remember, however, that in many countries, it was impossible until recent 
times to consider the constitution as a source of binding norms, when there was 
neither a constitutional court nor ordinary courts that were empowered to use 
constitutional texts in litigation.  European lawyers have long been accustomed to 
recognizing the authoritative force of statutory law and administrative regulations 
or decisions, while it is plausible that common law lawyers would be more 
reluctant to admit the growing importance of statutory law and more prone to 
develop softer forms of legislation (like experimental laws or sunset laws).  The 
French Constitutional Council struck down a 2005 statute on school programs, 
considering that it was a “paper law” without normative effects.118  The formal 
presumption of the validity of rules has to be questioned in some cases in order to 
determine whether an authentic legal norm exists. 
The preliminary identification of the legal changes that are used to construct 
legal orders in law books restates the questions of “legal pluralism” regarding the 
creation of legal norms by non-state authorities.  Our positivist point of view 
focuses on judicial decisions, which depend in any case upon recognition by the 
state that customary rules or social practices can give birth to legal norms.  The 
need to distinguish legal norms from other prescriptive systems conflicts with the 
idea of a completely spontaneous law.  Only the “law” can say what is legal.  This 
does not mean that a rigid conception of law denies force to norms that are initiated 
by social (non-official) actors and rejects “soft” law (droit soluble) as compared to 
the traditional “hard” law (droit solide).119  The well-known debates about the so-
called lex mercatoria illustrate different ways to identify legal change.  The 
arguments of the advocates of a new legal order based on the lex mercatoria can be 
summarized as follows: large firms have developed contracts which do not refer to 
national legal rules and which contain arbitration clauses; in case of a dispute the 
matter is referred to private arbitrators (who are not linked to any national legal 
order), to make decisions according to mandatory rules that emanate from these 
commercial practices; thus, a new transnational legal order has arisen with different 
rules created by these contracts and recognized by the arbitrators.120  The opponents 
of this conception reply that: (1) the freedom of the contracting parties is based 
upon national rules that are operative in the territories of the formation or the 
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execution of the contract, which give a private autonomy to the contracting parties 
within the limits permitted by public policy; (2) it is necessary, in executing the 
arbitrators’ decisions, to ask national judges for an exequatur; (3) even if 
arbitrators’ decisions are almost all recognized as valid, this recognition is based 
upon international agreements (for instance, the 1965 Washington Convention) that 
have been voluntarily subscribed to by states.121  A preliminary question, not 
always considered in the debate, regards the existence of legal changes that are 
implied by the lex mercatoria phenomenon.  The importance of these transnational 
contracts and arbitrations is undeniable.  Still, these contracts and arbitrations use 
(by a selection made after careful consideration) pre-existent rules (for example, 
the good faith rule, the clausula rebus sic stantibus).  If this is the case, there is no 
creation of new norms or alteration of existing legal orders.  It is another question, 
however, to determine whether legal scholars are interested in constructing a new 
legal order based on the principles of the lex mercatoria. 
Doing research on the legal changes which affect the construction of legal 
orders does not prevent us from taking account of the action of non-governmental 
authorities or from thinking about the possible decline of national legal orders.  
This does not mean that legal scholars must study all legal practices and norms 
inside one legal order, which is clearly impossible.  We are accustomed to selecting 
significant norms and to attaching value to the distinction between individual and 
general norms.  Citing Austin, Kelsen has contrasted individual norms, like court 
decisions, which concern only one case and a limited number of persons, and 
general norms that are addressed to a large group of non-denominated persons.122  
Beyond this formal criterion we must determine which norms are likely to change 
the representation of a legal order and which norms are routine decisions without 
any proven impact on the construction of the legal order.  In most cases, general 
rules, for example those contained in statutory law, are considered to affect legal 
orders, while individual rules established in routine decisions by courts or 
administrators appear to “repeat” a well-established rule and to apply it to 
determined persons.  A realist theory of interpretation will assert, of course, that 
any norm, even a routine decision, contains an interpretation of a legal statement 
and creates law.  This is precisely the reason why Kelsen wanted to use the word 
“norm” for every act that concerns the creation of law.  There is no doubt, however, 
that the effects of individual norms (even some of those contained in statutory 
form, for example the so-called “private bills” in English law), as they are limited 
to certain persons, are less likely to affect our understanding of a legal order.  This 
distinction is important whenever analyzing precedents and judicial legislation.  
One decision of a court (often a supreme court, but in some cases one or more 
decisions of subordinate courts) is presumed to be an individual norm, but it can be 
recognized (by the same judges or by other courts) as a general norm and legal 
scholars may admit (in making a selection of cases) that a precedent has been 
created.  It is in fact a persuasive argument, and not an automatic application of the 
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rule of recognition, that allows for the identification of precedents.123  Thus, we 
qualify norms as “general” when we think that they affect a constructed legal order.  
There is an unavoidable subjective judgment that links the identification and 
impact of the norm. 
B.  Measuring Legal Change 
In law books and law courses, it is customary to evaluate whether a legal 
change is significant or only a point of detail.  Conclusions may differ between 
European scholars, who are looking first at the hierarchy of norms, and consider a 
constitutional amendment to be more important than a legislative modification or a 
new judge-made rule, let alone an administrative regulation, and common law 
lawyers, who are acculturated to a selection of precedents.  Yet, in all countries, 
one must take into consideration the legal impact of a constantly increasing number 
of constitutional amendments, judicial review decisions, statutory enactments, and 
international agreements which blur the traditional and static view of legal orders 
as pyramidal hierarchies. 
The issue seems prima facie easier to resolve regarding constitutional and 
statutory enactments that are, in most cases (with the exception of private bills 
voted in favor of determined persons), general statements which are presented by 
constitutional or legislative authorities as amendments to the pre-existing 
normative corpus.  We should be careful, however, with the mythology of “law 
reform,” and distinguish between the political discourse that sees every new statute 
as a major reform and those reforms that are truly significant.124  Just as a statutory 
norm that is never applied by the courts can remain binding for officials and non-
officials alike, legal scholars may consider that it remains an important piece in a 
constructed legal order.  For example, a criminal statute calling for the death 
penalty may be retained in a legal order, even if there are no longer any capital 
condemnations or executions.  In India, the fact that section 377 of the Indian Penal 
Code, which criminalizes homosexual intercourse, has not been applied by the 
courts to consensual male-to-male sex since 1935, does not mean that this norm has 
been abrogated, and many Indian scholars consider that it remains an important 
piece of the national legal order, and impacts police practices and the 
stigmatization of homosexual persons.125  Is it not a limit on a realist theory of 
interpretation to make the observation that a norm could continue to be valid 
without continuing application by the courts? 
Concerning statutory law, the construction of legal orders can take account of 
the number of statutes and the range of their rules—but it is absurd to consider that 
every line of text and every paragraph or article has the same value in affecting 
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change in a legal order.  Still, the counting of the number of statutes which are 
enacted each year or the changes that are made in a code or body of law is not 
without value.  A legal order with a few rules that regulate a limited number of 
subjects is the criterion of a “primitive” law: for example, the Roman Law of the 
XII Tables at the beginning of the republic, which left to custom or to social 
practice conduct that was not regulated by law.126  On the contrary, the quantitative 
development of statutory law since the nineteenth century is an indication of a great 
transformation of legal orders through a growing interventionism that annexed new 
territories to the legal field.  The French Council of State has estimated that, in 
recent years, about ten percent of the articles of French codes have changed each 
year.127  Beyond the politically motivated criticism of legislative “inflation,” we 
now have a means to measure the rhythm of legislative change.  It should be said, 
however, that these new laws often have a length that is disproportionate to their 
importance.  Especially with respect to codified laws, this renewing of the legal 
corpus needs to be clearly evaluated by scholars in their consideration of the 
reconstruction of legal orders. 
Regarding case law, the problem is more acute because there is a more 
subjective and complicated task in the selection of new norms and the repeated 
application of existing norms that occurs without any change in the attribution of 
legal meaning to the normative statement.  Clearly, empirical studies and statistics, 
which are more and more sophisticated in our modern age of electronic databases, 
can help us distinguish between judicial legislation and routine litigation.  We have 
new means, in comparison with prior generations, to know how a supreme court’s 
decision is received and applied as a new norm by subordinate courts, or how the 
repeated changes that occur in the resolution of cases by inferior judges can impact 
a legal order, even if there is no apparent reaction by that legal system’s supreme 
court.  Litigation rates should be examined very carefully to avoid stereotypes 
about legal cultures, such as the allegedly high litigation rate in the United States 
and the allegedly low rate of litigation traditionally attributed to Japan.128  To the 
sociologist, the absence of a substantial amount of litigation about a particular 
question can be interpreted either as proof of an effective and well-accepted rule or 
as a clue to the weak impact of legal statements.  For the legal scholar trying to 
construct a legal order that takes account of law in action, statistics can be used in 
different ways.  If capital judgments are numerous, the decision to inflict the death 
penalty can be considered as a kind of “routine” justice, and one capital decision is 
not likely to change the legal order.  On the contrary, if these decisions are very 
few, every one could be interpreted as an act of judicial legislation that has the 
effect of clarifying in which specific instances the death penalty can be used in that 
legal order.  The growing rate of settlements, linked with the decline of civil trials, 
also has an impact on the legal order, if we are able to measure the legal fields 
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(characterized by the use of determined legal statements) in which settlements are 
drying up the stream of case law.129  Studying legal change through a historical 
perspective, even if this study focuses on recent times, still involves taking account 
of the flows of norms and the paths (based on the different sources of law) that 
such changes are taking.  The structure of a legal order can thus be affected by the 
advancement of case law to the detriment of statutory law, or by a contrary trend. 
Two other examples also illustrate the need to measure legal change through 
law in books. In many countries, judicial review that is performed by a supreme 
court or a constitutional court has become a growing phenomenon in recent 
decades.  There is no doubt that striking down a statute is the equivalent of enacting 
a new statute that is contrary to the one quashed or judged unconstitutional: it is 
“negative legislation,” according to Kelsen’s expression.130  However, the situation 
of a given legal order may vary if such changes happen very rarely (as in Japan, 
where only six statutes were struck down by its supreme court from 1973 to 2005), 
or if they are relatively frequent as in the United States, India, or Germany.131  This 
form of accounting is a clue, among others (such as the importance of judged cases, 
the impact of each law that was struck down, and the judicial review that later leads 
to constitutional amendments), as to how to qualify a judicial review system as a 
meaningful or not meaningful (as a “weak” or a “strong”) part of the larger legal 
system.132  The concept of “judicial supremacy,” if it even makes sense, depends on 
a holistic evaluation of the impact of court decisions on the legal order to see 
whether new judgments are consistently recognized as law in action. 
If we consider the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), as interpreted by the Strasburg Court, there is a clear need, which has 
been taken into account by recent studies, to use statistics in order to measure the 
rate of condemnations of each European state, and the changes in statutory or case 
law that are induced by the impact of the Court’s decisions on each nation, as well 
as trends pertaining to the application of the ECHR by national judges to change 
their national law.133  The lack of statistics about the number of national laws that 
are not applied by national judges because they are contrary to the ECHR makes it 
more difficult to appreciate the legal changes that stem from the ECHR.  More 
generally, we would study the manner (including frequency of application and the 
case law of subordinate courts) in which judicial review has been used by the 
different courts, and should not be satisfied by studying only a selection of leading 
cases. 
Measuring the impact of legal change also means taking account of the 
“density” of the legal order that is under construction.  Usually, we consider 
national legal orders to be comparable in their structures, and perhaps 
unconsciously, we transpose the principle of equality among states into a 
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presumption of the equal density of national legal orders: each legal system is 
imagined to have developed the legal categories with which we are familiar and to 
have adapted its rules through a relatively constant ebb and flow of statutory and 
case law.  I would suggest that legal history and comparative law should show us 
that the stratification and complexity of a legal order depends on its age (a state that 
recently gained its independence has at its disposal a smaller “stock” of rules than 
an older and powerful polity, even if in the case of a decolonized entity the laws of 
the colonial period have been generally maintained for a transitory period) and on 
its propensity to develop legal changes through statutory or judicial legislation.  For 
example, the legal order of Saudi Arabia, which has left the personal status of all 
Muslims citizens subject to sharia law (which is based on rules that come from 
interpretations of the Koran and the sunna, but is also somewhat open to significant 
evolution over time), has a lower density than that of neighboring states (like 
Kuwait or Oman) which have adopted national legislation (which is more subject to 
change) regarding personal status.134 
The conception of international law has changed in recent times.  When there 
were a few multilateral treaties with peremptory norms (the majority of treaties 
were bilateral agreements pertaining to friendly relations and commerce, with weak 
legal impacts), there was sporadic case law originating from international courts 
and a limited use of international rules by national courts.  But in recent decades, 
with the intensification of uniform rules which are contained in treaties ratified by a 
great number of states, there has been a development of an important corpus of 
decisions and awards from international tribunals and more frequent recourse to 
principles of international law in national case law.  The significance of 
international law has increased considerably, and has made obsolete the  
prior contempt of some lawyers for what they regarded as a “primitive” or 
“anarchic” legal order (if they did not flatly deny the legal character of 
international rules). 
In legal orders with a lower density, we can suppose that each change (every 
“law in action”) could have a deep impact on the structure which scholars construct 
in books.  However, I would argue that these legal orders demonstrate a lesser 
openness to change (often linked to non-democratic polities), and perhaps tied to 
the respect of tradition, which can give the feeling of a kind of immutability.  This 
is a false impression, because every legal order experiences some change through 
time, since a secondary rule of change is necessary for its initial characterization as 
a legal system.  But we also have to take account of the difficulties of measuring 
the impact of every limited change (limited because it concerns only a small sector 
within a much larger legal system) in the more complex legal orders which are 
accustomed to frequent legal change, because we can lose sight of (or on the 
contrary, cling to) components that are not affected by the broader rhythm of 
change.  The challenge here is to identify the modification (or the disappearance) of 
what might appear to be “fundamental,” but may in fact be subject to change. 
We should differentiate between the construction of “thick” and “thin” legal 
orders without any value judgment as to their respective desirability.  This 
evaluation of legal density can, of course, be combined with the use of different 
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lenses in a methodical approach, in particular, with a “thick” description as defined 
by Clifford Geertz.135 
C.  Following the Circulation of Legal Ideas 
Law in action, defined as legal change, takes place in time and space: it is one 
of the characteristics of the reality of normative facts.  When we construct legal 
orders in books, we think about change that occurs through time; in this way, every 
legal scholar is a legal historian, and conducts studies within a determined space, 
such as a specific state or a sub-state structure, or in an international framework, 
which is not always subject to closed territorial limits (for example, the canon law 
of the Catholic Church).  If the concept of legal transplants has become, especially 
since the work of Alan Watson,136 a specific and central subject for comparative 
law, the general problem of legal “circulation” is inherent in the study of all legal 
change.  In many cases, legal change might begin with a legal statement, which 
might come from the central authorities of a state (the seat of legislative power or 
the supreme court) and spread throughout the subordinate courts and the 
officialdom of the whole country.  This movement seems automatic, so much so 
that we are accustomed to “centralized legal orders,” to use Kelsen’s term.137  But 
in many historical situations and in some contemporary structures (federal or non-
unitary), a rule of law (with its particular meaning) has to be “received” in specific 
territories according to a specified process before it can be implemented.138 
Moreover, the process of the implementation of international conventional 
rules in national legal orders, either in a monist or a dualist system, is based upon 
the circulation of legal statements (which are contained in treaties or international 
case law) and how they are received as new meanings (through “domestic” 
interpretation) within national legal orders.  As there may be different 
interpretations linked to the insertion of an international statement into a national 
order, there is also a trend towards uniform solutions, especially if there is a supra-
national court which is empowered to guarantee an “authentic” interpretation, as in 
the case of the European Court of Justice.  Of course, even in the context of the 
European Union, we can presume that the same regulations or guidelines that 
emanate from European authorities are interpreted (and linked to other norms) in a 
different way in the United Kingdom, in Germany, and in France.  Thus, there is 
now a common corpus of rules (that did not exist before the EU) that is applicable 
in these different legal orders.  The Europeanization of the law means the 
circulation and reception of rules, both the primary treaties and the secondary 
regulations. 
This openness to uniform rules is less present, if not completely absent, in the 
case of the transplant of legal statements from one country to another.  There is, of 
course, no obligation of an independent state to follow the interpretation of law 
given by the exporting legal system, and it is very probable that a transplanted 
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statement will acquire new meaning(s) upon its application in the importing legal 
system.  There is no room today (as was the case with the Privy Council for the 
British dominions, even after their independence) for a transnational court to 
impose the same authentic interpretation in two different states. 
I do not, however, share Pierre Legrand’s opinion about the “impossibility” of 
legal transplants.139  His attacks on Alan Watson’s theory are based on the 
necessary “metamorphosis” of the allegedly transplanted rule into a new meaning 
which would be consistent with the legal culture of the importing state.140  Beyond 
a kind of quarrel over words, what Pierre Legrand denies (but without rejecting 
Watson’s thesis) is that the “transplant” of the same rule from one state to another 
can be called a “legal transplant” and that in the circulation of a legal statement 
which gives birth to a new meaning in the receiving state, there is an 
overestimation of cultural factors that act as points of resistance to foreign 
influences upon legal change.141  It appears, to the contrary, that cultural elements 
(such as the use of the same language, the same patterns of legal education, even 
the wearing of wigs by judges) circulate at the same time as legal statements and 
establish favorable conditions for the legal statements to acquire a similar meaning 
to the one they had in the exporting state (for example, look at the common law 
system in Great Britain, the United States, or India).  It so happens that in some 
cases the same meaning can be given to the legal statement which is shared by the 
exporting and the importing state, as is probably the case for the many rules of 
European law which are interpreted identically in different states. 
To deny the possibility of legal transplants is to close off explanations of the 
great movements of legal circulation in history, such as the globalization of Roman 
law, of common law, of legislative codifications, or of Islamic law.  Even if we try 
to consider these circulations as the elements of developing indigenous legal 
cultures (according to which Roman law or Muslim law would not be considered as 
“foreign” in European or Islamic countries) or to limit these massive transplants 
only to the colonial period, we would have great difficulty in explaining why some 
rules from abroad are received and maintained with the same meaning as the 
“original” in the exporting system.142  Thus, the proliferation of common law in the 
first decades of the American republic would become incomprehensible if we 
denied the existence of legal transplants. 
As these massive transplants are obvious in the history of legal change, they 
engender complex effects at two levels: in construing new rules through the 
interpretation and co-ordination of different statements (some of foreign origin, 
others of indigenous “production”), the judges and legislators of the “importing” 
country (sometimes completely) transform the legal materials that came from 
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abroad; and in a parallel way (which cannot be dismissed, even from a positivist 
perspective), the legal transplants are reconstructed by legal scientists (often from a 
national perspective, for example the “common law” as understood through 
Holmes’ famous studies) to create a new artifact which “naturalizes” (or 
nationalizes) the foreign input.  The results of these transplants, especially the most 
extensive transplants, are thus unpredictable and undeterminable.  As Gunther 
Teubner has proposed, it is like a “legal irritant,” which provokes a series of 
reactions that are not easy to comprehend in all their details,143 while legal science 
tries to simplify and to use, according to Michele Graziadei, “a generalization 
denoting a collage of legal artefacts.”144  I would suggest that because they have 
such comprehensive outcomes, legal transplants (or, if one prefers, legal irritants 
which are provoked by legal transplants) have been, incontestably, one of the more 
important ways to track legal change.  In many cases, colonial domination or the 
reception of foreign legal blocks (such as whole sections of Roman law or common 
law) had effects comparable to political revolution.  Are not legal revolutions 
merely the submission of a territory to the transferred legal order of a colonial 
power, or the declaration of independence of an ex-colony, simply another form of 
maintaining a large part of colonial law?  Are we not accustomed to say, in our law 
books, that new legal orders are established through colonization (and at the same 
time are distinguished from the legal order of the pre-existing polity before the 
arrival of the colonizers as well as from the “domestic” order of the colonizing 
power, with the possibility that no “legal order” existed before the arrival of the 
colonizers) and then through decolonization? 
It could be argued that the origins of new legal rules are, as pure facts that 
precede the creation of norms, indifferent to a legal science, which tries to describe 
normative systems.  But the legal tracks of change—those used to introduce or 
maintain these “foreign” elements—are part of the legal sphere, and cannot be 
ignored in the construction of legal orders; we cannot reject the concept of “legal 
revolution” (or a new legal order replacing an old one) merely by asserting that 
political revolution is a non-legal fact.  There are two main reasons why the 
circulation of legal change has to be taken seriously by “law in books.”  First, these 
processes of “borrowing,” the historical role of which has been underlined, are 
always active and productive.  The implementation of more and more uniform rules 
that result from international treaties, the development of transnational rules (as 
well as rules from European authorities which apply to all the member-states but 
have different possible meanings in each national order, much like a “global law” 
spread by multinational companies) and the rapid circulation of judicial precedents 
(especially those concerning fundamental rights and judicial review) throughout the 
world create new transplants, and their effects cannot be studied without taking 
account of their origins.  Second, comparative law is one field of legal science that 
is obviously interested in the study of the circulation of legal change.  Comparative 
law is clearly “law in books,” and not the description of an empirically organized 
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and settled system of law (no dispute is adjudicated according to a “compared 
law”), but the construction, by legal science, of an intellectual artifact by which to 
analyze the similarities and differences between national legal systems which are 
formally closed (which means that they reject foreign law, except to resolve 
isolated problems of conflicts of laws) but substantially open (which means that 
they readily accept legal content with a foreign origin).  Comparative lawyers are 
forced to take account of legal circulation (even if it is to deny the existence of 
legal transplants), and they shed light on how a decision about old concepts, such 
as the traditional opposition between common law and civil law, offers suggestive 
ideas about how to replace them with new constructions. 
D.  Understanding Legal Change 
It may be surprising, at first glance, that the goal of law in books to 
“understand” legal change could be consistent with a positivist point a view.  It is 
well known that legal positivism is based upon the so-called “Hume’s law,” 
according to which it is impossible to infer moral (or, more generally, normative) 
conclusions from non-moral (or factual) premises.  As Hume has written, “vice and 
virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason.”145  With 
different words and divergent conceptions of the separateness of “Is” and “Ought” 
(we have already noted that it is possible to use the expression “normative facts” 
without contesting this separation), legal positivists agree that it is impossible to 
comprehend the causal relations between (social, political, economical, cultural) 
facts and legal norms.146  For this reason, Kelsen rejected the idea that legal science 
must inquire about the “causes and effects of those natural events that, interpreted 
by way of legal norms, are represented as legal acts.”147  Such studies are left to 
(legal) sociology, political science, and possibly legal history (as a category of 
historical study and not as a part of legal science), but they are not the target of 
legal science. 
Hume’s law is an obvious and serious obstacle to the “understanding” of legal 
change by legal science.  I would like to show, in the last section of this article, 
which attempts to interpret Roscoe Pound’s ideas, that there is a way to combine 
the positivist (or analytical) approach with a legal analysis of the rule of change, 
and that it can be distinguished from sociological perspectives.  Our point of 
departure will be Max Weber’s work on legal sociology, which contains many 
points of comparison with Kelsen’s methodology, especially regarding the paradox 
of scientific objectivity when confronted with the problem of making value 
judgments.148  Considering that a value judgment is a matter of faith and not 
empirical science, Weber thought that the task of the historian was not to 
“construct[] ‘laws’ in the rigorous sense through the mere juxtaposition of 
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historical observations,” but to understand individual action through the use of 
ideal-types.149  I would argue that an understanding of human behavior is not found 
in the mechanical relationship between cause and effect, but through the 
interpretation of human actions and the treatment of single individuals as basic 
units.  Max Weber wrote that:  
Insofar as it looks at the law, sociology deals not with determining the logically 
correct “objective” meaning of legal propositions but with action, for which, 
naturally among other things, the ideas of men about the “meaning” and the 
“validity” of certain legal propositions play a significant role both as determinants 
and consequences.150 
As these words indicate, Max Weber separates legal sociology from legal 
science.  Legal sociologists undertake enquiries about human action as it relates to 
law or is influenced by ideas (or representations) concerning law.  Studies which 
address the political processes that create legal norms—the mobilization of parties 
(the “haves” and the “have-nots,” using Marc Galanter’s words151), activists152 and 
lawyers who engage in “cause lawyering,”153 or the impact (or absence of impact) 
of legal ideas about the informal rules that operate within social groups154—are 
familiar subjects for sociology and political science, and are often undertaken in 
conjunction with questions related to legal change.  These studies can be 
considered as an analysis of “law in action” and represent a sociological 
jurisprudence, which could be seen as consistent with Roscoe Pound’s project.  At 
the same time, even if we accept that legal sociology can help legal scientists to 
understand human behavior as it relates to law (especially to measure the scope of 
law’s empire and to keep in mind that the whole world is not ruled by law), we 
must also realize that legal rules cannot be explained by factual causes, and that 
legal systems are producing new rules in an “autopoietic” way (that is to say, that 
only law produces law; it is not produced by external factors).  A sociological 
approach to legal change and to an understanding of the attitudes or mentalities of 
legal professionals does not prevent an analysis of the impact of ideas that have 
been developed by legal writers within the legal sphere.  Legal writing is not only a 
representation of legal rules as they influence human behavior (for instance, the 
actions of legislators or the expectations of businessmen), it can also assist in 
tracking changes in legal rules brought about by new conceptualizations.  In the 
same way, the study of the social impact of routine case law should not be confused 
with the legal recognition of precedents as binding rules, just as an analysis of 
parliamentary debates does not have the same purpose as the interpretation of 
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statutory law in a legal system.  Kelsen’s attempt to maintain a separate (and 
“pure”) legal science, which cannot be integrated into a comprehensive sociology, 
is not contrary to the Weberian distinction between interpretive sociology and what 
Weber called “legal dogmatics.” 
Max Weber’s methodology has left space, even though it is not clearly 
formulated in his works on social epistemology,155 for a legal science that would 
not be reduced to a description of legal meanings or to the normative content of 
legal propositions.  Weber recognized that legal science needs conceptual tools.  
These conceptual tools are a variety of ideal-types, which we use in law books to 
construct legal orders and to understand legal change.  Some of these concepts (for 
instance, the idea of the state, of contract, of trial, of offense) seem like “natural” 
parts of the legal landscape, although they are human conventions, and “utopian” (a 
word applied to ideal-types by Max Weber156), like all legal concepts.  Other 
concepts (like democracy, economic exchange, patriarchal organization of family, 
social deviance), when considered outside the context of legal texts, can also be 
useful for understanding legal change.  As ideal-types, these concepts are formed 
by the one-sided accentuation of one or more normative facts.  Legal research, 
which is necessary to construct legal orders in law books, much like historical 
research as described by Max Weber, “faces the task of determining in each 
individual case, the extent to which [the] ideal-construct approximates to or 
diverges from reality.”157  As Weber wrote in The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality, 
the function of ideal-types is to allow “comparison with empirical reality in order 
to establish its divergences or similarities, to describe them with the most 
unambiguously intelligible concepts, and to understand and explain them causally.  
Rational juridical concepts supply this need for the empirical history of law.”158  If 
we consider that every study of legal change in law books is a kind of “empirical 
history of law” (and that every legal scientist is a legal historian who examines 
changes in the law including very recent changes), the construction of legal orders 
depends on ideal-types, and in consequence, cannot be reduced to a simple (and 
objective) description of legal meaning. 
Max Weber’s epistemology offers one final benefit to the legal scientist.  He 
has insisted upon the need to continuously construct “new ideal-typical concepts” 
in order “to discover ever new aspects of significance.”159  Paradigm shifts are not 
only observable changes in prior legal writing that give account of normative facts, 
but are useful tools with which to imagine new constructions and to confront them 
with the empirical reality of contemporary normative facts.  As some phenomena 
are likely to be interpreted as a retreat of state power or a decline of the opposition 
between common law and civil law countries, it is fruitful to construct legal orders 
without taking the state into consideration (as do the supporters of an ideal-type of 
“global law”) or to compare different legal orders by means of other criteria (for 
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example, the distinction between democratic and non-democratic states, or between 
a family law based on religious norms and one based on uniform national law) not 
linked to a colonial legacy.  If we challenge the proposition that the opposition 
between “concrete” and “abstract” judicial review corresponds with empirical 
normative facts, we need to propose new ideal-types for distinguishing patterns of 
legal change through judicial review.160 
The modern study of legal change requires the analysis, with the help of new 
ideal-types, of the legal avenues (statutory law, codified law, case law, 
international agreements, judicial review, new kinds of contracts and litigation, 
rules of conduct decided by multinational companies or recognized through 
collective bargaining with international trade unions, international awards, new 
meanings given to traditional sources of law, etc.) through which legal change is 
likely to justify the construction of new legal orders or the empirically verifiable 
metamorphosis of old legal orders.  Every lawyer who tries to write the “law in 
books” must be innovative in proposing new ideal-types and attentive to the 
possibility of checking these constructions by confronting them with empirical 
reality and the inevitable criticism from other legal writers.  In summary of our 
understanding of Pound’s formula, “law in books” is useful (if not necessary), as it 
is based on some minimal definition of what counts as law, and is dependent on the 
respective roles that are assigned to constructed legal orders and empirically 
recognizable norms.  As one of the main characteristics of law is its perpetual 
change, law in books should not remain motionless and faithful to traditional ideal-
types, but should continuously strive to identify, measure, track (as law circulates), 
and “understand” (as in Max Weber’s meaning) changes in normative facts (and of 
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